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Summary
This report examines the development of eight
small dam projects in the mountainous province
of Al-Mahweet in north-central Yemen. The report
also investigates how external assistance affects
incentives for local people to invest in dam
development and water delivery systems and also
to create rules, property rights and institutional
arrangements to manage the dam and water.
The development of small dams is a current
priority of the Government of Yemen and foreign
development agencies and banks. The objectives
of the government and aid organizations in
developing small dams are to provide sources of
water for domestic use, create new irrigated
areas, and recharge groundwater.
This study indicates how assistance strategies
and agreements between external agencies and
local communities may be designed so as to
inhibit or facilitate local investment, development
of social capital and achievement of favorable
outcomes.
This study shows how external assistance is
designed and arranged and how it can have a
substantial effect on the motivation of local people
to make investments and build social capital to
manage and benefit from the new infrastructure.
When villagers build a dam, those who invest in
its construction consider it as their own property.
The group of investors defines their own criteria
for membership and identifies rules for
investment, water extraction, water distribution,
silt removal and canal maintenance. Initial or
founding investors set themselves apart from
late-coming investors. They assign themselves
lower water fees and restrict others from
becoming shareholders. This serves to protect
their prior water rights and the value of their
shareholdings.
The cases support the view that the method
of assistance and the incentives they generate
may be more important than the social context in
building local organizational capacity and producing
synergy from joint state and community
investment.
Evidence suggests that cases with high
proportions of external assistance tend to also
have poorly developed rules for investment, water
rights and irrigation system management. The
report provides recommendations on how
assistance strategies may be designed in order to
stimulate local investment and facilitate the
development of social capital.1
1Field work for this study, implemented in 1998, was conducted with financial support from the FAO.vi1
Small Dams and Social Capital in Yemen:
How Assistance Strategies Affect Local Investment
and Institutions
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Introduction
This report examines the development of eight
small dam projects in the highlands of the north-
central Al-Mahweet region in Yemen. It
investigates how external assistance affects
incentives for local people to invest in dam
development and water delivery systems and to
create rules, property rights and institutional
arrangements to manage the dam and water.
The development of small dams is a current
priority of the Government of Yemen and of
foreign development agencies and banks. The
objectives of the government and aid
organizations in developing small dams are to
provide sources of water for domestic needs,
create new irrigated areas, and recharge
groundwater.
This study highlights each of these problems
and indicates how assistance strategies and
agreements between external agencies and local
communities may be designed in order to
facilitate local investment, development of social
capital and achievement of favorable outcomes.
The purpose of this report is to improve
understanding about the following questions:
1) What is the relative importance of social
context versus design of assistance strategy,
for building social capital and producing
favorable outcomes?
2) How should external assistance for the
development of water resources to serve the
rural poor be designed in order to produce
local social capital and favorable outcomes?
3) Can “state/society” synergy be created in the
short-term in most contexts or does it
depend on deeply embedded, long-term
traditions?
The case studies were selected to represent
two types of small dam development: 1) cases
where the majority of investment was from local
villagers and 2) cases where the majority of
investment was from external aid agencies. Each
case is discussed and the general findings are
summarized.2
Research on development assistance is
increasingly emphasizing the importance of how
development assistance is designed and what
kinds of incentives it creates for local people to
invest in physical and social capital (Shah 1996).
Principle-agent theory provides a theoretical
basis to better understand the contractual
hazards and incentive deficiencies that often
arise because of information asymmetries
between external agents and local communities
in the context of joint ventures and agreements
between the state and local communities (Wolf
and Huppert 2000; Williamson 1996). Information
asymmetries enable three kinds of contractual
failures to happen: 1) adverse selection; 2) moral
hazard; and 3) hold up.
Adverse selection happens when one of the
two parties to an agreement makes a suboptimal
selection of a good or service (or the service
provider) due to inadequate information. The
moral hazard problem arises when suboptimal
services or investments are made due to
opportunistic behavior of one of the parties to an
agreement, in circumstances where the client
cannot hold the agent accountable. The hold up
problem occurs when a client in a service
agreement is constrained to make a suboptimal
choice of a service or service provider because
the client is unduly dependent upon the agent (or
service provider). This is because of previous
investments and obligations made by the client
that would make it costly or difficult for him or
her to select other options.
This study, conducted in 1998, finds examples
of each of these problems and indicates how
assistance from external agencies to local
communities may be designed in order to inhibit or
facilitate local investment, development of social
capital and achievement of favorable outcomes.
This report examines eight cases of small dam
development in the highlands of the north-central
Al-Mahweet region in Yemen.
Development Assistance, Investment and Social Capital
By now it is conventional wisdom that local
institutions are essential for the effective
development and management of natural
resources (Carney and Farrington 1998; Ostrom
1990). The concepts of “public/private
partnerships,” “state/society synergy,” and “good
governance” are widely espoused (Rogers and Hall
2002; Siamwalla 2000; Smith 2000; Tendler 1997).
Even so, many governments and development
agencies persist in providing assistance in ways
that fail to build viable local institutions and “social
capital” (UNDP 1997). This is partly due to
perverse incentives and vested interests (Huppert
et al. 2001; Williamson 1996). It is also due to the
lack of awareness of what is needed to build local
institutions and how synergy between development
agencies and local communities can best be
created (Evans 1996).
Following Ostrom, et al. 1992, social capital is
defined as, “the body of shared knowledge on how
to organize people in a productive manner,” “the
self-organizing capabilities of people,” and “the
people and the patterns of regular, repetitive
interactions among them that transform inputs into
outputs” (Ostrom et al. 1992, pp. 6, 190, 191).
After an earlier period of pessimism about the
limited potential for collective action (Hardin 1968;
Olson 1965), recent literature documents the
emergence of social capital and synergy between
state and society in a wide range of contexts and
circumstances (Baland and Platteau 2000; Bromley
et al. 1992).
Recent research by the International Forestry
Resources and Institutions Research program
supports the view that:
The design of institutions that help a group
distribute the benefits and costs of their efforts
in a way that is perceived to be legitimate,
effective, and fair to that group is more
important than the particular attributes of the
group itself.
(Poteete and Ostrom unpublished).3
systems. Centuries of incremental exertion have
resulted in spectacular terracing of numberless
escarpments throughout the region.
But, today, the sustainability of irrigated
agriculture and even food security in Yemen are
under threat for at least the following five
reasons.
1. Availability of water for agriculture is
decreasing. This is due to drawdown of
groundwater aquifers because of overuse
and loss of soil water retention capacity in
upland areas, increasing competition for
water, and an apparent recent trend in
decreasing rainfall. Yemen’s total average
annual renewable water supply is about 2.1
billion m³. It is estimated that by the year
2010, the total annual demand for water will
be about 3.3 million m³, if current trends
continue. Availability of water in Yemen is
only about 130 m³ of water per capita per
year (compared with an average of 1,250 m³
for the Middle East).
4 However, it is
estimated that in Yemen 90 percent of the
population has less than 90 m³ of water per
Information was gathered mainly from
group and key informant interviews with
knowledgeable farmers who were involved
directly in the development of their dams.
2 The
Yemeni villages vary by ethnic or tribal groups,
proximity to markets, but each was basically
dominated by the same local ethnic group,
which generally comprised of mostly poor,
smallholder farmers. The case studies were
selected to represent two types of small dam
development: 1) cases where the majority of
investment was from local villagers; and 2)
cases where the majority of investment was
from external aid agencies. Each case is
discussed below and general findings are
summarized.
Irrigated Agriculture under Stress
Yemen is a mountainous and arid country with a
population of 18 million, located in the
southwestern part of the Arabian peninsula.
Annual rainfall in highland areas varies between
400 and 760 mm. Two peak rainfall periods
provide potential for double cropping of short-
season crops in some highland areas that are
irrigated, during the eastern monsoon in April/
May (seif season) and the western monsoon in
July-September (kharif season).
Of Yemen’s 55 million ha of land area, only
1.1 million ha is cultivated, of which 671,000 ha is
rain-fed and 429,000 ha is irrigated. Approximately
2.2 million ha is under agro-forestry. Eighty percent
of the cultivated area is planted with cereal crops,
such as wheat, sorghum, maize, millet and barley.
Irrigated areas have higher cropping intensities and
more diversified cropping, including vegetables,
fruit, cotton, coffee, tobacco and qat.
3
For centuries the resilient people of this
mountainous southwestern part of the Arabian
peninsula have developed highly sustainable
farming systems, which include indigenous
methods of water harvesting, water spreading
and construction of small dams and irrigation
2Interviews were held on site, complemented by inspections of dams and water delivery systems. Staff of local MAI (Ministry of Agriculture
and Irrigation) offices were interviewed separately.
3The leaves of the qat plant are a popular stimulant used mainly by Yemeni men. Qat is profitable and its requirement for water has not been
established yet. Approximately 30 percent of water used for agriculture is used for qat production.
4The international average per capita water availability is 7,500 m
3 per year.4
capita per year. Only 69 percent of the
population has access to an “improved water
source,” most of whom are not in the upland
areas.
2. High growth rate of an impoverished
population is outpacing growth in agricultural
production. Yemen has a high population
growth rate of 2.8 percent per annum. About
75 percent of the population lives in rural
areas where 61 percent of the population is
employed in agriculture. Gross net income
per capita is only US$450 per year and 46
percent of children below 5 years of age are
malnourished.
5 Yemen is one of the poorest
countries in the world and its population is
highly dependent upon a relatively fragile
agriculture.
3. A trade deficit is making importation of food
increasingly difficult. Yemen had a trade
deficit of US$104 million in 2001. Exports are
projected to decline while demand for imports
is rising (with food being the main import).
4. Soil erosion is increasing while the water
retention capacity of soils is decreasing.
Widespread deterioration of terraces, soil
erosion and desertification are reducing the
water retention capacity of soils.
5. Relatively low productivity and profitability of
irrigated agriculture. This is making it
increasingly difficult for rural families to
support themselves in agriculture. Many men
migrate from rural areas in search of jobs. In
many cases this leaves the task of local
farming to women and children. Because of
the ability of irrigation to increase cropping
intensity and diversification, it is the main
way to increase the productivity and
profitability of agriculture and, thereby reduce
the need for men to leave their village homes
to seek other sources of income elsewhere.
5Figures taken from “Yemen Republic at a glance,” at www.worldbank.org
Development of Small Dams in Yemen
The development of small dams in the
mountainous regions of Yemen is a priority of the
Government of Yemen (GOY) because of its
potential to provide sources of water for domestic
use, creating new irrigated areas and recharging
groundwater aquifers. A variety of programs,
funding sources and procedures are used by
external organizations to develop small dams in
Yemen, including the Agriculture and Fisheries
Production Promotion Fund (AFPPF), Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), Social
Development Fund, the European Union, USAID
and other providers of bi-lateral assistance.
At the national level, the National Water
Resources Authority, which has the mandate to
develop a water policy and strategy, and the
General Directorate of Irrigation are relatively
new organizations that have critical shortages of
skilled staff and resources. At the governate
(province) and district levels, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation and its Irrigation
Department generally have little, if any, funds for
development, operations or maintenance of dams
and water delivery systems. In general, they lack
the capacity to provide support to avert rapid
deterioration of irrigation systems, to regulate
over-extraction of groundwater or to plan small
dam development according to basin level
analysis and planning for integrated water
resources management.5
approached the Ministry of Agriculture and Water
Resources (MAWR) in 1994, which agreed to
give one 15-hp diesel pump to the village,
8 and
left the villagers to purchase the other pump.
Water is pumped 25 meters out of the canyon to
where it is distributed through an open channel
network. After construction, the villagers were
generally satisfied with the construction of the
dam, but could see water regularly spilling over
the sill of the lower dam, so they proposed that
the height of the sill be raised from 9 to 13
meters. It was estimated that this improvement
would increase the storage capacity of the lower
reservoir from 24,000 m³ to 48, 000 m³ (table 1
in the annexure). The upper dam was 8 meters
high and had a storage capacity of 27,000 m³.
The village did not plan to upgrade the upper
dam, but the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
(MAI) insisted on increasing the thickness of the
dam at the base from 2 to 5 meters, for safety
reasons. The village planned to increase
pumping capacity after the upgrading was
completed.
In 1996, the villagers requested additional
assistance from the government and this was
accepted. The MAI designed the upgrading and
the new AFPPF fund agreed to finance the
project on a 50/50 cost sharing basis. The
villagers argued that their previous investment in
the first phase of work should be considered in
the cost sharing, so the AFPPF agreed to a 70/
30 cost sharing formula for the upgrading (i.e.,
30 percent to be borne by the villagers).The
AFPPF refused to provide assistance for
obtaining another pump or pipes for the
distribution system.
Development and Investment
More than 30 years ago a man in Bait Abdullah
village piled stones in the wadi
6 near the village
to collect water for his family’s use. In the 1970s
some engineering technicians visited the village
and said that the stone weir would be a good
site for a small dam. Other villages proposed that
the small stone weir be made into a small dam
for the benefit of the whole village.
Representatives of the village group appealed to
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MOAF)
to provide the necessary resources for this
proposal. The MOAF agreed to provide the
village with 1,000 bags of cement.
7 The MOAF
informed the villagers that they would have to
provide all the rest of the materials and the labor
required at their own expense. Convinced that no
other assistance would be given, 72 of the 120
families in the village agreed to provide the
additional 3,000 bags of cement required and the
necessary labor. Families could join the project
and become beneficiaries by providing either
cement or labor, or a combination of the two.
The remaining 48 families did not support the
project either because they did not believe that
the project would be successful in providing
enough water for everyone or they did not have
sufficient money or adequate labor to contribute.
The MOAF agreed to the location and design
of the two dams that were proposed by the
village (a member of the village committee was
experienced in construction) however,
construction took 2 years. The small upper dam
and larger lower dam were 100 meters apart,
therefore two pumps were needed. The villagers
6A wadi is a small seasonal river that goes dry each year.
7One bag of cement = 50 kgs.
8The pump has a 2-inch pipe outlet and a capacity of 2.5 l/s.
Case One: Bait Abdullah Dam, Shibam subdistrict6
Building Social Capital
As is the case in the other villages of these case
studies, Bait Abdullah village consisted primarily
of a single tribal group of relatively poor people.
There is not much socioeconomic inequality
among the villagers. The villagers estimated that
their fields would need water at least once in
every 18 days, and they divided the 72 members
(who were the initial investors) into 18 rotations
of one day each, with each rotation irrigating four
farms per day. The founding members of the
dam association decided that the water charge to
the founding members should be YR (Yemeni
Riyal) 100/hr (US$0.71) for water pumped, while
other users, which were the 48 families that did
not invest in construction would pay YR 200/hr
(US$1.42). Founding members who wanted water
beyond their normal allotment would then pay YR
200/hr (US$1.42) to receive water outside of the
normal 8-hour pumping day. The water charges
were used for fuel, oil and spare parts for the
pumps, salary for the pump operator and de-
siltation of the reservoir (in addition to silt taken
voluntarily). The founding members allowed open
access to the reservoir for anyone to remove silt,
since this helped sustain the functionality of the
reservoir and it encouraged incremental
expansion of the irrigated area because villagers
used the silt for topsoil. Both water and fertile
topsoil were constraints on the area that could be
irrigated.
During the second phase of development,
large trucks were needed to enter the area for
construction. Construction occurred during the
rainy season and the road that passed through
five villages needed to be repaired. The main
beneficiary village agreed to pay half the cost of
road repair and the other four villages agreed to
pay the other half of the cost. The total cost of
road repair was YR 400,000 (US$2,860), done in
1998. A bulldozer and driver were hired to do the
work and they shared the cost according to the
size of the village and distance of the village
from the road. The beneficiaries made these
unanticipated expenditures and then did not have
enough left to cover their 50 percent share of the
project. This was part of the reason the village
pressed the AFPPF for a 70/30 cost sharing
arrangement. Sometimes villagers or farmer-
groups got involved in disputes between farmers
over accusations that some were working less
than others. This could stop farmers from
providing their share of the investment.
Water conveyance losses in the open
channels were high but the farmers were
optimistic that they could obtain assistance from
some aid agency to purchase the required pipes
for the distribution system. Hence, they decided
not to purchase it outright but to search for
assistance. By the end of 1998, farmers had not
contributed their agreed 30 percent share for
upgrading and had no plan to do so. Villagers
said that they hoped to obtain assistance from
other aid agencies for the pump, pipes and
remaining 30 percent share of work for upgrading
the dams. By the end of 1998, the contractor
had finished 70 percent of his share of the work
and refused to complete his full share (which
was 70 percent of the total) until the villagers
contributed their 30 percent share.
Both the contractor and sub-contractors lived
in the village, as such, both were subject to
some social pressure and monitoring by the
villagers. After completion of the initial phase,
MAI officers approved the quality of construction
but believed that both dams were too thin and
should be thickened during upgrading. Villagers
did not agree and preferred to use more of the
materials for increasing the height of the dam,
rather than the thickness. But the AFPPF
technicians prevailed and designed the upgrading
according to the specified thickness. Villagers
had the view that the process of developing the
dam was too slow and required a lot of political
lobbying and they needed political connections to
get assistance. They said that they did not
expect to receive any assistance to maintain or
repair the dam, so they would have to do it
themselves. Any future costs of development or7
system extension would be shared equally
among the 18 shares held by the 72 founding
members and latecomers would not be permitted
to invest.
The initial investment by villagers established
a property right among the 72 initial investors to
first access rights for water at reduced cost.
Non-investors were obliged to pay twice as much
for water, which subsidized the cost of O&M
(Operation and Maintenance) for the initial
investors. The initial subsidy of 1,000 bags of
cement coupled with a clear signal that no
additional assistance would be forthcoming,
provided sufficient incentive for 72 of the 120
families in the village to mobilize 3,000 bags of
cement and the required labor.
However, for the second upgrading phase of
dam development, terms and conditions for
assistance had changed. The AFPPF finally
agreed to a 70/30 cost sharing ratio for
upgrading, but the villagers failed to provide their
share during the agreed schedule for
construction. Although this cost sharing formula
was much more favorable to villagers than was
the initial one, and the likely benefits were much
more visible than before the first phase of
development, the political lobbying had made
villagers more aware of various funding sources
and they were inclined to search and wait for the
best deals for obtaining another pump, several
hundred meters of pipe and for alternative
assistance to complete the upgrading. From the
perspective of the AFPPF, they were reneging on
their commitment to contribute 50 percent from
their own resources (even though they had
agreed to count previous local investment as part
of the 50 percent village share, which made the
local share really only 30 percent for the second
phase). From the villagers’ perspective, they
considered alternative sources of funding largely
as their contribution due to the considerable
efforts they had to make in searching and
lobbying for assistance.
The first phase of relatively high local
investment and low external assistance resulted
in considerable effort by villagers to develop
water distribution, maintenance and investment
rules. The second phase of development had
relatively high external investment with a low
level of local investment. However, the rules and
rights were elaborated and membership was
extended. Organizing and building social capital
occurred through a process of, first,
experimentation by a few villagers in building a
temporary weir. This was followed by a relatively
open process of village meetings, families freely
opting in or out of the project, using investment
in materials and/or labor as the basis for granting
water property rights, negotiation between
villagers and providers of assistance, searching
and lobbying for additional assistance, and
developing group rules for water distribution,
maintenance and investment. The collection of
water fees and construction of the dams
established both social and physical capital
simultaneously, but not for the village, rather for
the social group that invested in the dam.
Outcomes
The technical staff of the MAI agreed with the
location of the dam in the village, but said that
there was a technically better site downstream
(at a narrower part of the wadi, which would be
cheaper to build and have better storage
capacity), but the downstream village had not
requested it.
Immediately after completion of the initial
stage of dam development, the scheme was only
able to irrigate 4.5 ha of land, mainly due to the
small capacity of the two pumps. Before
irrigation, farmers planted wheat and barley or
sorghum and maize once a year. After irrigation,
farmers planted these plus another cash crop
season for alfalfa and vegetables (especially8
completion of the dams, 800 people in the village
and 1,200 people from other villages began to
take water from the reservoirs for domestic
needs, including washing of animals.
garlic and onions). Water for domestic use was
more important than irrigation. Before the project,
villagers (mostly women and girls) walked 5 km
to carry water for household use. After
Case Two: Bait Fakhar Ad-Den Dam, At-Tawila subdistrict
Development and Investment
In the late 1980s, two brothers from Bait Fakhar
Ad-Den village returned to Yemen from working
in Saudi Arabia and visited the famous Marib
Dam, which inspired them to try to build a small
weir in their home village. In 1987, their two
families built a small masonry weir and, after
seeing that ponding was substantial and stable,
they raised the height of the sill with the support
of four other families. They tried to persuade
other villagers to join in enlarging the dam
further, but others lacked confidence in the
project or thought it would be too expensive. The
average landholding size in the village is less
than 1.0 ha per family, with little variation in size
between them. All villagers belong to the same
tribal group. The first phase of construction took
6 months, during which time the six families
rotated between a group of five working on site
and the sixth preparing food and attending to the
children. Women poured and carried cement.
Work was intermittent since the group needed
time to incrementally raise funds for more
cement and materials and then needed to find
time to do the work. After the first phase, the
dam was only one meter thick at the bottom.
The next step was to build a second small
weir downstream several meters from the first
weir and then divert water to their fields via
gravity pressure through a 2-inch metal pipe.
They purchased pipes incrementally and tested
the levels and slope of different routes to
determine which route delivered water most
efficiently. At first they purchased 500 pieces of
galvanized metal pipe (6 meters each for a total
of 3,000 meters) at a cost of YR 200 per piece
(for a total of YR 100,000 or US$714). Two
years later they purchased another 200 pieces.
This was an indigenous effort without external
assistance. Only the original group of investors
was allowed to purchase and use the pipes.
After the first phase of development, four
other families saw the benefit of the small dams
and also wanted to divert water from the wadi.
But the original group of six investor families
refused them as they feared that there might not
be enough water for all of them. The four “late-
comer” families responded with a proposal to
build another weir about 100 meters upstream.
The original group (already a recognized holder
of water rights by prior appropriation) agreed to
their request on the basis that water was
frequently overtopping the first dam. With this
arrangement they were convinced that there
would be sufficient water for the additional dam.
The ten families altogether owned only 7.7 ha of
irrigable land.
At this time, in latter 1992, a team from a
GTZ (German Agency for Technical Co-operation)
project visited the area and advised the villagers
that the proposed additional weir would be
feasible, and they agreed to share the cost of
construction. The original group of six and the
second group of four agreed to work together on
the project. The GTZ staff and villagers also9
agreed to raise the height of the first dam and
build a fourth small dam another 50 meters
upstream from the third one. GTZ provided 800
bags of cement and the villagers provided labor
and other materials. Again, work was done
incrementally and intermittently according to the
availability of labor and money. They also
increased the height of the first dam to 18
meters and the thickness to 5 meters at the
bottom and 1.5 meters at the top (table 1 in the
annex). Before the small dams were developed,
the fathers of all 10 families were working in
Saudi Arabia. Some returned to Yemen to help
with construction, while some remained in Saudi
Arabia to raise more funds to support continued
construction of the dams.
When incremental development of the dams
progressed to the point where the lands of all 10
families could be irrigated, the remaining fathers
who were in Saudi Arabia chose to return to their
village in Yemen to engage in irrigated
agriculture. The now larger group of investors
purchased an additional 300 pieces of pipe for
distribution of water and continued to use them
on a trial and error basis to identify proper
routing of pipes to obtain a maximum service
area. They installed a valve and 50-meter plastic
hoses at the end of each metal pipe to rotate the
water between fields. It was apparent that, had
villagers received more technical support in the
beginning, they could have designed and built a
water delivery network with much less pipe than
that was purchased.
In the latter part of 1994, villagers had heard
that there were assistance programs for the
development of small dams and irrigation
networks, and representatives of the group of 10
shareholders visited the provincial MAI office in
Al-Mahweet to request further assistance. An
engineer from MAI visited the site and said that
the weirs were too narrow and should be
widened for safety reasons. He estimated that a
fifth dam would raise the total storage capacity of
all dams to 96,000 m³ and the improvements
would cost YR 22.5 million (US$160,714).
However, the engineer said that if they built the
fifth dam only a few meters above the first dam,
where the canyon was narrower, it would yield a
total storage capacity of 73,800 m³ for both the
first and fifth weir, and would cost only YR 16
million (US$114,286). This indicated that if the
villagers had technical support in the beginning
they probably would not have built the first three
dams where they did.
Thereafter, the 10 shareholders heard about
the AFPPF fund for small dam development,
which required 50/50 cost sharing. The farmers
proposed that their previous investment be
counted toward their 50/50 share, saying that if
their new contribution (which they proposed to
provide in labor and materials) was only 20
percent of the estimated cost of YR 16 million
(US$114,286) for the fifth dam, they could
complete their contribution within one year,
otherwise they would need more time.The
AFPPF accepted this proposal.
Building Social Capital
In the early stage of dam development, the
original shareholders began collecting silt and
depositing it on unused village land that they
reclaimed for personal use, obtaining about 1 ha
from open-access village land. When other
villagers saw the benefits that the shareholders
were deriving from the land reclamation and
irrigation, the village authorities stopped the
shareholders from reclaiming village land and
decided to allocate all additional reclaimable land
equally among villagers. After holding
negotiations between the village and the
shareholders, a compromise was reached to give
the shareholders some additional village land and
to distribute the rest among the other villagers.
After the first weir was built to nearly 18
meters in height, the 10 shareholders agreed that
5 of the original shareholders would take water
from the first (lower) dam and the other 5 would
take water from the upper dam. They divided10
water rights equally among themselves, based on
their equal shares of investment rather than the
share of land used by each. When the AFPPF
fund required a 50/50 matching contribution, the
10 shareholders agreed to provide their individual
contributions in equal amounts, thus retaining the
principle of equal investments and equal rights
between them.
 The shareholders installed a pipe that
conveyed water from the upper reservoir down to
just below the lower one, where water from both
reservoirs was combined into a single main pipe
that divided into several branches downstream.
Two valves just below the lower dam enabled
farmers to take water either from the upper or
lower reservoir. The shareholders agreed to
rotate water turns every two days for one day
each, between the group taking water from the
upper reservoir and that taking from the lower
reservoirs. In the morning, the water users for
that day must open the valve for the reservoir
from which he or she is supposed to take water.
The last user of the day must turn off the valve.
Eventually, additional families in the village
requested to join the group of irrigators and
offered to pay shares in the capital costs of
construction that had been invested by the other
10 families up to that time. But the group of 10
refused the offer and decided that they would sell
water to the “late-comers” at the rate of YR 200
(US$1.42) per hour of service, compared to the
amount of YR 100 (US$0.71) that the 10 agreed
to charge themselves. Shareholders and non-
shareholders alike pay YR 200 (US$1.42) per
hour for water used during the reserve time.
Fees collected were used for the repair of pipes,
de-silting of the reservoir, to pay the salary of the
pump operator, and for the purchase of more
pipes to extend the delivery system. The dam is
emptied every 2 to 3 years for de-silting. Silt is
used for topsoil to reclaim land or is flushed
down the wadi. On average, about YR 135,000
(US$964) is collected in fees during the kharif
season (which is about 90 days in duration).
Fees collected in excess of the requirements for
O&M are divided equally among the original
shareholders.
The shareholders and other villagers agreed
to rotate water every other day between
shareholders and non-shareholders. The original
shareholders each received water for 8 hours
every 16 days. Water allocations were
determined on the basis of requests at the
beginning of the season, except for multi-season
crops like alfalfa (with rattoons), which were
determined in the form of 2- or 3-year water
allocation agreements. Water used during the
extra 4 hours of reserve time for emergencies or
other special requests was arranged on a first
come, first served basis. Hence, water can be
made available for up to 12 hours per day at any
time of the year.
At the beginning of the season, non-
shareholders who wanted water allocations for a
coming season went to the most senior man of
the original shareholders (the “water leader”) to
request an allocation of hours per 16 days. The
water leader, appointed by the initial group of 10
investors, scheduled irrigations. When requests
exceed available time, late-coming requesters
must wait for the next season for an allocation.
Sometimes, non-shareholders rotate water
among themselves between seasons. Original
shareholders automatically receive their 8-hour
allocation every 16 days.
Villagers invested considerable funds to
reclaim 2.5 ha of land, by transporting silt from 5
km away by truck and depositing it on irrigable
land at a depth of 35 cm. This was a group effort
that cost YR 2,200 (US$15.71) per truck load of
silt for 1,130 truck loads to transport soil, for a
total of YR 1.4 million per ha (US$9,800).
For the most water intensive crops (like garlic
and onions), farmers reported that they could
irrigate 250 sq meters per hour, or one-fifth of a
hectare in 8 hours, in which case some farmers
wanted water every 8 days instead of every 16
days. Because of differing crops and planting
schedules between farmers, some would trade
unused time with other farmers in exchange for11
water on a day that was not their normal rotation
date.
In Bait Fakhar Ad-Den, the extensive amount
of initial local group investment in dam
development involved a parallel development of
organization, property rights and management
and financing arrangements for water delivery
and system maintenance. The founding
shareholders in the dam and water delivery
system asserted their rights of prior appropriation
to the water and their right to require “latecomer”
water users to pay a higher amount for water
services and to reimburse the shareholders their
initial and subsequent investments. In effect, this
reinforced their assertion that the dam and
conveyance system belonged to the group of
initial shareholders. Assistance from the
government was minimal and required cost
sharing, which stimulated local investment.
Social capital was built through the
incremental process of experimentation and
investment by the shareholders; rotational labor
inputs; negotiations between shareholders,
“latecomers,” village government, MAI and
AFPPF; development of differential water rights
between shareholders and latecomers, allocation
and fee arrangements and water trading. All of
this  established social capital resided primarily in
the group of shareholders rather than at the level
of the village government.
Outcomes
After the first and second stages of development,
the dams provided water to irrigate 14 ha, if
irrigation was the sole source of water. When
there was rainfall and irrigation was used
only for supplemental supply, 22 ha could be
irrigated. Before the dams were built,
farmers cultivated rain-fed wheat and maize.
After the advent of irrigation, farmers
cultivated potatoes, tomatoes, lentils, garlic,
and apple and olive trees, partly for personal
consumption and partly for the market.
Wheat and maize were cultivated only on
rain-fed land. After the introduction of
irrigation, farmers coordinated crop patterns
to minimize the risk of yellow and red rust
attacks.
By 1998, there were 22 families or 102
farmers (about five persons per family) who
farmed parcels of land irrigated by the dams
(ten of which were the original shareholders).
About 2.5 ha of the 22 ha of irrigated land
developed were reclaimed by de-silting the
reservoirs and depositing silt as new topsoil on
barren land.
Before the first dam was built, only one of
the shareholder families had a cow. After a few
years of irrigation, each shareholder family
obtained three to five cows and non-
shareholder water user families had two to
three cows each. Before the dam was built, the
villagers had to travel 10 km to obtain water for
domestic use and, as such, they could not
carry enough water for the animals. The main
limiting factors for raising livestock were lack of
feed and water. Irrigation provided water to
produce more straw and fodder and other
animal feed, as well as drinking water for
livestock.12
Development and Investment
Before 1990, farmers in Bait Al-Ma’mar village
irrigated small parcels of land along the wadi with
about 80 small pumps of about 2-hp each and
five tubewells (with 19-hp pumps). In 1990, a
group of farmers from the village visited Bait-Fakr
Ad-Den village and saw the benefits of its small
dams. They returned and held several meetings
with other villagers and identified which families
were willing to invest in dam construction and
become shareholders. The group reckoned that
they could save about 50 percent on the cost of
operations and maintenance if they built a dam,
because they would no longer have to pump
groundwater. A delegation from the shareholder
group visited the provincial MAI office in Al-
Mahweet to request technical and financial
assistance. MAI staff visited the site, agreed on
the location, provided technical advice and
offered to provide 350 bags of cement if the
villagers provided another 150 bags, other
materials and labor. Twenty-five families agreed
to become shareholders and invest equally in
developing the dam. Shareholders hired laborers
to build the dam and it was constructed in 4
months, at a cost of approximately YR 2.5 million
(US$17,857) or YR 100,000 (US$714) per share
for 25 shares. The dam was 14 meters high, 6
meters thick and 6 meters wide at the bottom,
and 1.2 meters thick and 22 meters wide at the
top. The storage capacity created by the dam
was 40,000 m³ (table 2 in the annex). MAI staff
noted that concrete was made manually (without
cement mixers) and the walls of the wadi canyon
were not excavated and smoothened, thereby
causing seepage on the sides and making the dam
not safe as it should be.
When the Minister of MAI visited the area,
the shareholders asked him for a large pump to
lift water 30 meters out of the new reservoir to a
feeder reservoir. The minister requested the
AFPPF to provide it. The villagers and the
AFPPF agreed that the latter would provide a 24-
hp pump (with discharge capacity of 6.25 l/s) if
the shareholders would obtain 3-inch metal
galvanized pipes to convey water up to the
feeder reservoir and to the fields. This was
agreed and the pump and pipes were installed.
However, the shareholders did not construct a
flushing escape for silt and as a result the
reservoir silted up within 2 years. As an
immediate remedial measure they broke a hole in
the dam to flush the silt (which, incidentally, took
one month’s work). Thereafter they decided to
install a large pipe for flushing the silt once in
every 2 years.
Building Social Capital
The dam supplied water to 75 family farms, which
were divided into 25 equal shares between one
and four farmers. In accordance with the national
law for cooperative societies (Law 18, 1994), the
shareholder group established themselves as a
cooperative society and formed a committee and
board of directors. The Cooperative agreed to
arrange irrigations in intervals of between 12 and
16 days. In the beginning, the group estimated
that the irrigation interval should be 16 days, so
they started with 16 shares, but more people than
expected wanted irrigation, so they increased the
size of the Cooperative to 25 shares. They also
reduced the duration for an irrigation to 6 hours
(to be divided among all holders of the share)
and allowed the pump to operate for 12 hours per
day, which was enough to irrigate two shares per
day. The more frequent the interval was the
higher the cost of water became. The water
charge rate varied between YR 250/hr (US$1.78)
and YR 400/hr (US$2.85), depending on the
estimated seasonal cost for O&M, level of
demand, and frequency of a rotation interval for a
Case Three: Al-Ma’mar Dam, Bait Al-Ma’mar village13
particular share. The fee was collected upon
initial delivery of water. At the end of an irrigation
season, the committee generally allocates
between YR 100,000 (US$714) and YR 150,000
(US$1,071) for O&M costs for the next season.
The rest was distributed among shareholders
according to how many shares each obtained
through their investment to develop the dam and
water delivery system.
In 1998, farmers estimated that there was
about 6,000 sq meters of topsoil inside the
reservoir. They planned to remove and use most
of it to reclaim land or add topsoil to farms, but
they did not yet have the necessary funds and
equipment to initiate this plan.
In brief, the amount of local investment
relative to external assistance was very high, but
the overall cost was relatively low. Water
allocation and other rules were well developed.
The allotment of shares was based on the
proportion of the investment. As with the other
cases, investment, shareholdings, search for and
negotiations with parties providing external
assistance, and trial-and-error investments were
all important parts of the process. However,
members of the new Cooperative complained
that they need to go to the province and even to
the national level to obtain information on dam
assistance programs and lobby for assistance.
They recommended that the process be
decentralized to the district level. Elements of the
process of building social capital in Al-Ma’mar
were similar to the other cases.
After the Al-Ma’mar Dam was completed in
1992, members of the Dam Cooperative
Committee decided to form a regional committee
to promote dam construction in other wadis in
the region, as a business enterprise. Initially they
selected five dam sites for development.
9
Outcomes
About 63 ha can be irrigated from the dam for
supplemental irrigation, when there is normal or
above-normal rainfall. Without rain, the dam can
irrigate 45 ha. About 400 sq meters can be
irrigated per hour. During the seif season in 1998
(March-June), the Cooperative pumped water out
of the reservoir for a total of 1,800 hours at the
chargeable rate of YR 400 (US$2.85) per hour.
Approximately 33,000 m³ of water was extracted
from the reservoir.
After irrigation became available, farmers
started cultivating garlic, onions, tomatoes,
potatoes, cucumber and apple trees. By 1998,
farmers had converted 50 percent of the land to
produce qat (which required less water and labor
and was a good cash crop). Farmers reported that
before the dam, the water table was 210 meters
below the surface. After the dam was constructed,
farmers reduced the depth of tubewell pipes to 200
meters and expected this to decrease further.
Open wells had gone dry before the dam was
constructed, but held water seasonally after the
dam was built.
9This included the Sahib Dam site in Al-Khyat village, in the At-Tawila subdistrict.14
Development and Investment
The Sahib Dam site, in Al-Khyat village, was the
first site selected for development by the new
regional Dam Development Cooperative (that
was formed after the construction of the Al-
Ma’mar Dam). It was selected first among the
five villages because it had the largest estimated
potential service area, the largest number of
villagers who would be benefited and the lowest
cost of construction per unit of service area. In
agreement with local villagers, the Cooperative
submitted a proposal for the project to the district
MAI office in 1995. The Cooperative obtained an
agreement with the AFPPF to share the
estimated cost of YR 14 million
10 (US$100,000)
on a 50/50 basis. For its 50 percent share, the
Cooperative provided equipment, materials and
labor and they became the contractor for
construction, and the AFPPF paid its 50 percent
share of the cost to the Cooperative (because it
was the contractor). The Cooperative tried to
persuade the AFPPF to provide assistance to
purchase pipes for the conveyance network, but
it declined since it was their policy to only
provide assistance for the construction of dams.
11
The dam was completed in early 1997. It
was 19.5 meters high, 65.5 meters wide, 8
meters thick at the base and 2.5 meters thick at
the top. Storage capacity of the reservoir was
80,000 m³ (table 2 in the annex). MAI staff
estimated that this could be increased to 120,000
m³ after silt was removed from the reservoir.
Building Social Capital
Water users included people from five villages,
including some of the shareholders from the
Ma’mar Dam project who were members of the
regional Dam Cooperative Committee. A Sahib
Dam development committee was formed with
representatives from each of the five villages. A
staff of the subdistrict MAI office also joined the
Sahib Dam development committee.
Representatives from each village met seasonally
to decide on the water distribution plan and settle
disputes. The representative from the MAI office
acted as a mediator to settle disputes.
The regional Cooperative Committee planned
to recover its 50 percent share investment in the
Sahib Dam from the sale of water to the
beneficiaries, who resided in the five villages. It
was agreed that the water fee would be set on
the basis of estimated costs of O&M of the dam
and the delivery system. Everyone, both
shareholders and non-shareholders, would pay
the same price for water. Any funds remaining
after the costs of O&M were paid would be
shared on the basis of 75 percent to the
Cooperative shareholders and 25 percent to all
water users from the five villages.
Even 2 years after the dam was constructed,
there was no irrigation because the Cooperative
committee was still searching for additional
sources of assistance to purchase a large pump
and the conveyance pipes. They had not
purchased any small pumps. The Agricultural
10The actual cost rose to YR 18 million (US$128,600) because they discovered that the depth of soil at the dam base was 14 meters instead
of 3 meters, so considerable extra excavation was required.
11AFPPF staff said that AFPPF had this policy because there was such a large demand for assistance for dams and it wanted to respond to
as many requests as possible.
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constructing the dam with a 50/50 joint
investment involving the five villages, regional
Cooperative members and a MAI representative,
all of whom negotiated investments, fees, shares
and profit-sharing among both shareholders and
non-shareholders.
Outcomes
By the end of 1998, 2 years after completing the
construction of the dam, water had yet to be
diverted from the Sahib Dam reservoir, while
cooperative members searched among
government offices and aid agencies for grant
assistance to purchase pumps and pipes. Farmers
continued to cultivate wheat, barley and maize on
rain-fed land, and they planned to cultivate
vegetables on irrigated land. Farmers reported that
springs located downstream of the wadi began
producing more water after the dam was
constructed. Farmers intended to use this water
solely for irrigation.
Development Bank of Yemen charged between 7
and 12 percent service charge for credit
purchases of items such as pumps or pipes. So
the farmers decided to look for other sources of
grant assistance.
The Cooperative estimated that 16 ha could
be irrigated from the dam, which would serve
approximately 400 farmers (including all family
farm workers). They calculated that the main
irrigation interval should be 18.5 days, based on
an estimate that each village would need an
irrigation turn of about 3.5 days.
Investment cost was very high and shared
on a 50/50 basis between the government and
the villagers.The development of rules and
institutions was inhibited and it precipitated a
dispute. Farmers said that they needed extension
support for methods to distribute and apply
water, cultivate vegetables, rotate crops and
control pests.
This project was started by the new
nongovernmental regional Cooperative and
initiated a new regional scope for village-based
development of small dams. It succeeded in
Case Five: Al-Makik Dam, Hobah village
Development and Investment
The idea for building a small dam at Hobah
village arose from a visit in 1987 by an officer
from the provincial MAI office in Al-Mahweet. The
officer observed the low discharge of wells in the
area and noted the high cost of spare parts and
maintenance. Farmers cultivated wheat, barley,
corn, potatoes and vegetables (which were
irrigated from open dug wells). The farmers of
Hobah village began looking for financing, and in
1997, they finally obtained funding from an
Agricultural Imports Fund, sponsored by the
USAID and administered by the MAI. The donor
paid for 100 percent of the cost of constructing
the dam, but no assistance was provided to
install pumps or the conveyance network.
The first design specified that the dam should
be 14 meters high at the spillway. This was later
revised to 20 meters high. Project staff
underestimated the depth of topsoil over the
bedrock, which caused delays and search for
more funds. The dam was 16.5 meters thick at
the bottom and 3 meters thick at the top, and 25
meters wide at the bottom and 65 meters wide at
the top. The total storage capacity was 200,000
m³, while the cost of construction amounted to YR
55 million (US$393,000), (table 2 in the annex).16
Building Social Capital
During the construction of the dam a conflict
emerged between farmers who had 70 ha of
potentially irrigable land upstream from the dam
and farmers who had 17 ha that could be
immediately developed downstream of the dam
(which, they said, could be expanded to at least
70 ha). The upstream farmers argued that they
should get 75 percent of the water because they
had most of the land, but the downstream
farmers thought that this was unfair since the
upstream users would have to pump water out of
the reservoir, while water could flow by
gravitational pull to the downstream users. The
downstream farmers were ready to start irrigating
immediately after the dam was constructed, but
the upstream farmers objected and said that the
downstream farmers could not use water unless
both groups used it together. It was apparent that
the potential water supply was insufficient for all
87 ha and the upstream group did not want to
risk losing the 75 percent share that they felt
they should get, and could get if the downstream
farmers began irrigating first. The upstream
group was hoping to obtain a pump from the
government.
The upstream group said that they should
take 75 percent of however much water would be
available and proposed that water be distributed
to upstream users for 9 hours a day and to
downstream users for 3 hours a day. The
upstream group said that the downstream group
should help them find funds for the pump and
distribution system and that the downstream
group should pay one-third of the cost of O&M
(including the cost of pumping water to the
upstream area), for the reason that both groups
were going to be served by the one project. The
upstream group said that they had already
formed a cooperative organization to manage
O&M for the whole project, but the downstream
farmers reported that they did not know of such
an arrangement. The upstream group
emphasized that they were the ones who had
promoted the dam project, and exerted pressure
on the government to approve it and even paid
travel expenses for MAI staff to visit the area
and prepare a design. (The downstream farmers
said that they would pay their share of these
costs after the dispute was resolved.) The
upstream group asserted that the dam was the
government’s property and would be completed
eventually.
The downstream group held the view that
both upstream and downstream farmers should
be beneficiaries, but priority water rights should
be given to downstream farmers because they
had used water from the wadi even before the
construction work on the dam began. They said
that the dam was located where it was in order
to mainly serve downstream users and they
argued that the potential irrigable area
downstream was larger than the potential
irrigable area upstream. Nevertheless, they
proposed that the water be divided in 50/50
shares between the upstream and downstream
areas in order to resolve the dispute. But they
said they had no money to contribute to the
purchase of a pump or conveyance pipes (which
were needed by the upstream group). They said
that they intended to specify a fixed time period
after the construction of the dam to wait and not
use any water from the reservoir so as to allow
upstream farmers sufficient time to purchase a
pump and pipes for their use. If after the lapse of
this given period, the upstream group had not
purchased a pump and the necessary pipes and
started irrigating, the downstream group would be
compelled to dig channels and start using the
water downstream.
By the end of 1998, there had been several
months of delay in further construction. The
contractor had completed almost 80 percent of
the work on the project when he discovered that
the depth of the soil over the bedrock was
greater than expected and that more funds were
needed for the extra excavation. Because there
was no agreement over how water would be
shared between the upstream and downstream17
the upstream nor downstream group could assert
a clear basis for water rights, obligations and
rules. The different technical and financial
requirements between upstream and downstream
areas compounded the problem. The external
financial capital was used in a way that
prevented the development of local social
capital—a critical element in enabling the dam
project to have a lasting social value.
In brief, although Al-Makik had a high level of
external assistance, it was handicapped by a
major dispute between upper and lower end
users over investment and water rights, which
led to a poorly developed institutional basis for
governing, managing and financing the new
water supply.
areas, they were unable to identify what the
service area would be and who would be the
water users. The downstream group said that
since the dam was the government’s project, the
government should resolve any problems related
to the use of the dam.
During the planning and construction stage,
the donor and government focused on the
physical construction of the dam and provided
100 percent of the capital costs externally. There
was no effort made to identify the service area
and beneficiaries (because the project focused
on the dam only). Absence of any prior
agreement about who were the beneficiaries and
the lack of investment by the prospective
beneficiaries created the situation where neither
12Generally, the maximum level of assistance allowable per dam was YR 15 million (US$107,000).
Case Six: Zeham Dam, Zeham village
Development and Investment
In the early 1990s, residents of Zeham village
made a request to the provincial MAI office in Al-
Mahweet for a feasibility study to build a dam at
their village. Farmers from the village visited the
MAI for technical advice and for a supply of
cement. They wanted to make a small dam,
which would not be too expensive because they
only had a limited amount of funds. The district
MAI office did a study and submitted a request
for cement to the MAI office at the national level
(in Sana’a). A team came to the site from the
national office of MAI and proposed to change
the site to another location where the storage
capacity would be larger. They recommended
that the farmers submit an application for
assistance through the AFPPF. Due to the high
expected cost (YR 30 million or US$214,300),
the application was rejected by the AFPPF.
12
After this they went to the Social
Development Fund (SDF) and a SDF engineer
also saw that the plan was too expensive. He
went to the site with staff from the MAI and did
another study and estimated what the service
area would be. The SDF team found that the
wells had very low yields and could only be
operated about 2 or 3 hours at a time before
they ran out of water. So they agreed with the
original design but disagreed with the estimated
cost. They revised the cost estimate to YR 28.7
million (US$205,000) and proposed to go ahead
with the project, with the SDF providing 85
percent of the financing and the villagers the
balance 15 percent. The Cooperative agreed and
decided to contribute its 15 percent share in the
form of renting and providing heavy equipment
for construction (such heavy equipment was
owned by the members of the Cooperative).18
The application was submitted to the SDF in
September 1997, and was approved in
November 1997. Construction began soon
thereafter, with an estimated time of 24 months
needed for completion. By December 1998,
construction work was 80 percent completed.
The dam was 18 meters in height and 62 meters
wide at the top. It was 12 meters thick at the
bottom and 3 meters thick at the top. The dam
created a total storage capacity of 120,000 m³.
The planned irrigated area was 30 ha, upon
which were 30 farms serving a total of 1,875
beneficiaries (table 2 in the annex).
Building Social Capital
Before the project, the area depended on rainfall
for a sufficient supply of water. Without
supplemental irrigation farmers often experienced
crop failure and had to cut the crop early and
use it for livestock feed. Farmers intended to
plant 100,000 coffee trees in the irrigated area.
In order to be eligible for SDF assistance,
the farmers organized themselves into an Al-
Faiha Agricultural Cooperative. Since it was a
multi-purpose, profit-making cooperative, villagers
could voluntarily invest as much capital as they
liked and, thereby become shareholders in the
Cooperative. They agreed to distribute dividends
periodically to shareholders from profits made by
the Cooperative. The dividends were based on
original capital investment in the dam project.
Farmers calculated that during the two rainy
seasons (seif and kharif) they could provide
supplemental irrigation for 30 ha, providing two
irrigations per parcel at 16 days apart at the
latter part of the season. Between these seasons
(when there was normally no rain) farmers
expected to provide full irrigation to only 12 ha of
the 30. During the supplemental irrigation period,
farmers estimated that the irrigated area per
parcel that could be served would be about
1,000 sq meters. This would drop to about 640
sq meters per irrigated parcel during the full
irrigation period. Annual rainfall in the area is 700
mm.
At the recommendation of the SDF (which
has poverty alleviation as its main goal) the
Cooperative decided to charge YR 10 (US$0.07)
per m³ to “normal” farmers and YR 5 (US$0.03)
per m³ to “poor” farmers. The definition for
“normal” versus “poor,” according to the SDF,
was to be based on the following criteria: total
number of persons in a family, woman-headed
household, number of old people in the
household, socioeconomic status, total farm area
owned, number of workers and handicapped
people in the household. It was decided that the
total water allocated at the rate of YR 5
(US$0.03) should not exceed 50 percent of the
service capacity of the dam.
Farmers of the Cooperative expressed their
view that they fully owned the dam. They
intended to distribute water on a demand basis,
giving priority to farms that were nearest to the
dam and only after their needs were met would
the water be distributed to the fields that were
further away. This priority-based system did not
account for the “poverty” status of farm families.
The poverty alleviation criterion for water
charging of the SDF was therefore alien to local
conceptions of how to allocate water equitably.
The agreement signed between the SDF and
the Cooperative did not include anything about
the development of the irrigation network, but a
fixed pipe outlet was built into the dam. By the
time of this study, the Cooperative had not yet
planned how to develop the conveyance network.
In brief, the dam project in Zeham involved
relatively high levels of external assistance and
low levels of local investment. The development
of institutions and rules to manage the water and
apportion of water rights were poorly developed.19
Assistance Strategies, Investment
Arrangements and Social Capital
Literature on development and social capital,
shows that researchers like Tendler (1997),
Evans (1996), Fox (1992), and Moore (1989)
note the importance of complementarity of the
resources and strengths of the state in relation to
society and the importance of close but
transparent relationships between the state and
local communities. This study shows that the
way in which external assistance is designed and
arranged can have a substantial effect on the
motivation of local people to make investments
and build social capital to manage and utilize the
dam and the irrigation scheme. Small dam
projects in Yemen normally include only the
construction of the dam and not the irrigation
network. When external assistance is provided
only for the construction of the dam the work on
the water delivery network and irrigation was
often delayed. Where external providers of
assistance took the lead in financing and
constructing the dams, it was done without
carefully specifying in advance what kind of
water service would be provided, where the
service area would be located and who would be
the water users. Moreover, the case studies
indicate that villagers are in need of technical
assistance for dam site placement, proper
excavation and thickness of the dam required for
the safety of the dam.
The multiplicity of sources of external
assistance and diverse terms and conditions for
the provision of assistance created some
confusion and stalling among village groups.
Sometimes it encouraged a speculative, shopping
mentality among rural people who responded by
taking a lot of time to search and wait for
favorable, or more favorable, low-cost terms of
assistance. To an extent, this may be good
because it could pressure the government to be
responsive to the needs of villagers. Too much of
such a mentality, however, may create an
excessive dependency of the people on the
government, which can have a negative impact.
The study indicates that when villagers build
a dam, those who invest in its construction
consider it to be their own property. The group of
investors defines the criteria for membership and
identifies rules for investment, water extraction,
water distribution, silt removal and canal
maintenance. The initial or founding investors set
themselves apart from late-coming investors, and
the former assign themselves lower water fees
and restrict others from becoming shareholders.
This serves to protect their prior water rights and
the value of their shareholdings. This is
consistent with Ostrom et al. (1992) and Coward
(1986), who have noted the importance of group
investments in creating locally-recognized
property rights and effective institutions to
manage resources. Social capital emerges from
a pattern of decisions, investments, and
development of institutions (rights, rules and
authority) that emerge incrementally. This is often
prompted by a few enterprising individuals who
persuade others to invest and experiment with
small dams. At some point, the original group of
investors and their corresponding rights and
benefits are determined and distinguished from
latecomers. People from the village government
and/or MAI may facilitate the process.
If the government builds a dam at its own
expense, villagers see it as the government’s
dam. If farmers are not organized as a group
and invest cooperatively in dam development,
they tend to be less motivated to use and
maintain the dam than the village groups who
are the major investors in their projects. They
lack the “social capital” or organizational capacity
to complete, operate and maintain the project.
The study team observed several cases in Al-
Mahweet, where extended time had passed after
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completion of the dam and farmers had not
developed the water conveyance and distribution
network for the dam.
Table 1 in the annexure shows information on
the levels of investment farmers provided in the
Bait Abdullah and Bait Fakhor Ad Den small dam
projects (cases 1 and 2). In both cases, in the
first phase of development, where farmers only
expected modest assistance from the
government, villagers provided between 71
percent and 75 percent of the cost of materials
and all of the labor. In the second phase of
development, in both cases, after farmers
became aware of other government assistance
programs, their share of investment was
dramatically less.
 Table 3 in the annex shows a consistent
pattern of large local investment where external
assistance is small, and small local investment
where external assistance is large, among the
eight cases of small dam development activities.
It also indicates that cases with high proportions
of external assistance also have poorly
developed rules for investment, water rights and
O&M.
Al-Makik and Zeham received relatively high
shares and amounts of external assistance.
Both had poorly developed rules and institutions
for managing water. Internal conflicts related to
the external assistance arose in both villages.
Al-Makik village had a serious dispute over
water rights. Zeham village adopted a two-tiered
water charge due to pressure from the project
donor. It was a contentious matter for the
villagers to define who was “poor” and who was
“normal.” Several opposed the externally induced
water charge rule, which was seen by villagers
as incompatible with their conceptions of
fairness.
MAI officers reported that in the beginning of
dam projects farmers tended to agree to provide
50 percent of the total cost. Later they realized
they could not invest this amount, often due to
the occurrence of unexpected expenses, such as
the need for more excavation or the building of
access roads. Sometimes farmland was lost to
the dam or reservoir and no compensation was
given by the government. So the farmer group
paid compensation money to the farmer whose
land was used in the project and this amount
was subtracted from their intended 50 percent
contribution to the core project. Also,
sometimes a road had to be built or repaired,
especially during the rainy season, which
required extra work and a large truck to
transport cement and materials, for which the
farmers had to pay. Or sometimes farmers did
not have the money to follow through with their
cost sharing agreement. Also, if the village
leader is not strong or is not supporting the
project, it can be difficult for farmers to raise
the agreed level of local investment.
These cases illustrate the fragile nature of
incentives for farmers in Yemen to invest in the
development of small dams and irrigation
networks. Poorly planned subsidies and
inconsistent approaches between development
agencies can easily discourage local
investment, create disputes and inhibit
institution building. Often, the mere speculation
that external assistance might be available on
easy terms is enough to cause extensive
delays in local investment. It is not the amount
of external assistance that affects local
willingness to invest. It is more how the
assistance is planned in order to require local
investment.
On the other hand, the cases support the
view that the design of assistance and the
incentives they generate may be more
important than the social context in building
social capital and producing synergy from joint
state and community investment. This is seen
in the different responses made by Bait
Abdullah and Bait Fakhar Ad-Den between the
first and second phases (where the social
context remained the same) and by the general
pattern of responses to dominating or facilitating
modes of assistance. The Yemeni villages vary
by ethnic or tribal groups and proximity to21
markets, but each was basically dominated by
the same ethnic group which generally had a
large majority of poor, smallholder farmers. The
cases also imply that state/community synergy
can be created in the short-term by the design of
assistance strategies and that such synergy is
possible in settings with deeply embedded, long-
term traditions.
Local investment is the key to building local
social capital. Group investment builds trust and
capacity among farmers to also invest in other
areas, such as land reclamation, coordinating
cropping patterns and pest control. When local
people do invest, they tend to do it incrementally,
through a process of trial and error and
purposeful linking of investments to water rights.
Water rights are defined in shares based on the
share of investment made by the shareholder.
Investment depends on people making a
distinction between investors and “late-comer”
clients, the latter which do not have durable
rights, but only a temporary right of access, on a
pay-for-service basis, that too only after the
rights of shareholders are met first.
Principal Agent Problems versus
Synergy
The manner in which the assistance strategies
were designed and implemented, particularly
those that were dominated by external
investment, created significant risks of the three
types of principal-agent problems as noted above
(e.g., adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold
up). These were evident in the case studies.
13
Apparent examples of adverse selection
problems are:
1) when villagers failed to select an assistance
option after an extended period of time due
to the expectation that they would find better
terms from other donors (Sahib); and
2) when villagers selected a donor but found
out later that it required water distribution
rules that were locally unacceptable (Zeham).
Indications of moral hazard risks were:
1) the gateway role played by MAI staff who
had knowledge of different donors,
knowledge which villagers normally did not
have; and
2) inability of donors to monitor the level of local
investment and the ability of villagers to
exaggerate claims about how much they
invest in labor and materials (to enable their
actual share of investment to be less than
agreed amounts).
Apparent examples of the hold up problem
were:
1) pressure on the government to increase
funding for a project beyond agreed terms
after the contractor finds out that the depth
of the soil above the bedrock at the dam site
(as in Al-Makik) was underestimated;
2) one-sided dependency of upstream farmers
on downstream farmers to invest in pumps
and conveyance pipes and the hydraulic
ability of downstream farmers to wait them
out (as in Al-Makik);
3) after the project begins and the donor has
invested most of its share, villagers have
leverage to persuade the government to
agree to reduce their share of investment,
because they know that the government
needs to account for the successful use of
its funds (Bait Abdullah second phase). This
is a hold up problem in that villagers have
leverage over the local government, which
has already made an investment and may be
persuaded to provide additional assistance to
make the overall investment successful.
13These are only indicative of contractual failures. More information is needed to confirm and explicate these relative to actual agreements
made between the stakeholders.22
Results: Do Synergy and Social
Capital Matter?
As was seen in table 1 in the annexure, in the
cases of Bait Abdullah and Bait Fakhor Ad Den,
development costs per m
3 of water storage
created (not including labor) varied from YR 21
(US$0.15) to YR 763 (US$5.45) per m
3. This
wide range in cost per unit of storage created
reflects the relatively ad hoc and unsystematic
nature of project selection among the providers
of assistance. Also, in both sites the total cost
per m
3 of water storage created was substantially
higher for the second phase of development,
which received substantial government
assistance.
 Table 3 in the annex indicates that, where
the share of farmer investment is substantial (in
Bait Abdullah Phase 1, Bait Bakhar Ad-Den
Phase 1, Al-Ma’mar and Sahib) the total cost per
m
3 storage created tends to be lower (average of
US$ 0.73/m
3 storage created) than in the other
four cases where the external assistance
constitutes a large share of the total investment
(US$2.50/m
3 storage created). In other words,
external assistance produces high-cost projects
and discourages local investment. All three cases
where the water users were the primary investors
(Bait Abdullah Phase 1, Bait Fakhar Ad-Den
Phase 1 and Al-Ma’mar) resulted in the rapid
utilization of the dam (in terms of construction of
the water delivery infrastructure and development
of the irrigated area). In all cases where the
government or donor was the primary investor,
utilization was delayed or still pending at the time
of the study.
14Although this might seem like conventional wisdom, it is, in practice, still not the norm.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In Yemen, the approaches for providing
assistance to develop small dams are quite
variable and subject to the influence of various
international donors. There is a lack of a single
basic strategy and terms and conditions. The
incentives, pressures and support for village
groups to get organized and build social capital
are relatively weak. This study suggests that in
order to ensure positive and sustainable results
of water resources development projects,
creation of local organizational capacity should
be given at least as much attention as the
construction of infrastructure.
14 This study
supports the views of Cernea and others (Cernea
1993; Cernea and Meinzen-Dick, ND) in saying
that it is important to balance project
organizational intensity (the extent to which
projects emphasize organization-building) with
organizational density (the degree to which
society is organized relative to the requirements
for such organization, such as the need to
develop and manage small dams). This study
found both organizational intensity and density to
be quite low in the beginning, but village groups
in need of more water were quick to respond to
opportunities.
Although social context (especially property
relations, inequality, etc.) is important, the
experience of these cases suggests that a
consistent, effective strategy of joint investment
may produce favorable results across different
social contexts. Creating a local sense of23
ownership by requiring substantial local
investment in project development, is an
essential part of developing local institutional,
managerial and financial capacity (i.e., social
capital) to use the infrastructure effectively and
sustainably after completion. The study suggests
that, prior to project implementation, prospective
water users should be organized into groups and
make agreements with the government to provide
a significant share of the total cost of the project,
through labor, material, equipment or other
relevant contributions.
To ensure that both parties (government and
farmers) fulfill their commitments, it is
recommended that projects should be divided
into stages, each with agreed targets and levels
of investment to be provided by both parties. At
each stage, each party can demonstrate that
they are fulfilling their part of the agreement. If
the beneficiary group fails to fulfill its part of the
agreement, the government would be able to
curtail the unproductive use of its funds. This
would provide more incentives for farmers to
fulfill their agreed share of investment.
This study suggests that donors should be
cautious about imposing different terms for
providing assistance for the development of
small dams within a country. This may create
local dependence on the government and
encourage villagers to shop and speculate
among donors and projects. However, as long
as this doesn’t place villagers in the role of
mere supplicants, if they are organized, they
can place pressure on the government to be
responsive to the needs and capabilities of the
villagers. In order to discourage dependency, it
is recommended that governments consider
adopting a consistent set of principles for
assisting villagers to develop small dams and
the requisite social capital to effectively and
sustainably use them.
The incremental but relatively rapid reactions
of the social groups to assistance options
presented suggests that synergy between
external assistance and local investment can be
created relatively quickly and widely as long as
an appropriate process and effective incentives
and accountability mechanisms are applied.
This study suggests that the most important
and effective role the government and
development assistance agencies could play is to
provide a single and consistent strategy to:
1) promote local investment in the development
of both the dam and water delivery network;
and
2) build local institutions to manage the dam and
delivery system or create such managerial
capacity in existing ones.
This would probably be accomplished most
effectively with the following strategy:
1) external assistance is based on local
requests, analysis of basin development
potential and constraints and agreements
about cost sharing and institution building;
2) clear and consistent policy for cost sharing;
3) facilitating the building of local institutions to
govern, manage and finance operations and
maintenance of dams and water delivery
networks;
4) the provision of appropriate technical
assistance (especially for dam site
identification and safety requirements); and
5) phased parallel joint investments and
monitoring by villagers and the assistance
agency.2425
Item Bait Abdullah Bait Abdullah Bait Fakhor Ad Bait Fakhor Ad
Phase 1 Phase 2  Den - Phase 1 Den - Phase 1
Government’s cost and share for materials $2,464* $44,978 $1,971 $114,400
(25%) (96%) (29%) (near 98%)
Beneficiaries’ cost and share for materials $7,393 $1,928 $4,929 (Small but
(75%) (4%) (71%) unspecified)
Labor provided by (number) Beneficiaries Government Beneficiaries Government contract
(72) contract (12) and beneficiaries
Year completed c. 1990 Pending 1987 Pending
Height to dam sill (meters)9  m  (upper dam) 13 m (upper dam) — 18 m
Thickness of dam at bottom (meters) 3.3 m (upper dam) 9.8 m (upper dam) 1m 5m
Area irrigated (ha) 4.5 ha Pending 21 ha Pending
Storage capacity created 24,000 m3 48,000 m3 75,000 m3 21,000 m3
Development cost per ha irrigated** $2,191 Pending $329 Pending
Cost storage created/m3 (YR)** $0.41 $0.97 $0.15 $5.45
Annex: Tables
TABLE 1.
Development of Bait Abdullah and Bait Fakhar Ad-Den dams.
Item Al-Mamar Sahib Al-Makik Zeham
Government’s cost and share $863* $50,000 $392,857 $174,059
(2%) (50%) (100%) (85%)
Beneficiaries’ cost and share $44,588 $50,000 0 $30,716
(98%) (50%) (15%)
Total cost $45,450 $100,000 $392,857 $204,776
Height of dam sill (meters) 14m 19.5m 20m 18m
Width of dam at top (meters) 22m 65.5m 65m 62m
Thickness of dam at bottom (meters) 6m 8m 16.5m 12m
Area irrigated (ha) 63 ha 16 ha 78 ha 30 ha
Storage capacity created 40,000 m3 80,000 m3 200,000 m3 120,000 m3
Cost per hectare $721 $6,250 $5,037** $6,826**
Cost per m3 storage created $1.13 $437 $1.96** $1.70**
Year of completion 1992 1997 Pending Pending
TABLE 2.
Development of Al-Mamar, Sahib and Al-Makik dams.
Notes: *All figures in 1998 US dollars, where US$1 = Yemeni riyal 140. **Figures are planned amounts, since construction was not completed
at time of study.
Notes: *Figures are in 1998 US dollars.  US$1 = Yemeni riyal 140. How material costs will be shared between government and farmers is still
under negotiation. **Does not include costs of labor.26
# Dam Main Incentive for Development of Cost/m³ storage Pace of
Investor users to invest* social capital** developed utilization
1 Bait Abdullah Users High Well developed $ 0.41 Rapid
Phase 1
2 Bait Abdullah Government Inhibited Well developed $ 0.97 Delayed
Phase 2
3 Bait Fakhar Ad-Den Users High Well developed $ 0.15 Rapid
Phase 1
4 Bait Fakhar Ad-Den Government Inhibited Well developed $ 5.45 Delayed
Phase 2
5 Al-Ma’mar Users High Well developed $ 1.13 Rapid
6 Sahib 50% Government Inhibited Moderate $ 1.25 Delayed
 /50% Users
7 Al-Makik Government Poor Poor $ 1.90 Pending
8 Zeham Government Inhibited Moderate $ 1.70 Pending
TABLE 3.
Investment arrangements, institutional development and outcomes of eight small dam development projects.
Notes: *As affected by awareness about terms and conditions for assistance. **This means the extent to which institutional, managerial and
financial arrangements were in place for utilizing the dam at the time of dam construction. All figures are in US dollars.27
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